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Reality monitoring refers to processes involved in distinguishing internally generated in-
formation from information presented in the external world, an activity thought to be
based, in part, on assessment of activated features such as the amount and type of
cognitive operations and perceptual content. Impairment in reality monitoring has been
implicated in symptoms of mental illness and associated more widely with the occurrence
of anomalous perceptions as well as false memories and beliefs. In the present experiment,
the cognitive mechanisms of reality monitoring were probed in healthy individuals using a
task that investigated the effects of stimulus modality (auditory vs visual) and the type of
action undertaken during encoding (thought vs speech) on subsequent source memory.
There was reduced source accuracy for auditory stimuli compared with visual, and when
encoding was accompanied by thought as opposed to speech, and a greater rate of exter-
nalization than internalization errors that was stable across factors. Interpreted within the
source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), the results are
consistent with the greater prevalence of clinically observed auditory than visual reality
discrimination failures. The significance of these findings is discussed in light of theories of
hallucinations, delusions and confabulation.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The source monitoring framework (SMF) proposes that
memories do not contain labels or tags that directly specify
their source, but instead that the origin of memories ishology, University of Cam
ons).
d by Elsevier Ltd. Thisinferred, for example, from characteristic features (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Such features might comprise:
(i) contextual attributes such as spatial or temporal detail, (ii)
sensory attributes such as colour or pitch, (iii) semantic in-
formation and emotional qualities, and (iv) internal cognitive
operations such as those involved in reasoning or thinkingbridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK.
is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
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tains auditory but no visual features, its origin might be
attributed to the radio rather than TV.
If the source monitoring judgement relates to the internal
or external origin of the memory (that is, whether an event
was imagined or really did occur), the attribution process is
referred to as reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Mem-
ory traces of perceived and imagined events are different on
average, with greater cognitive operations content for self-
generated information and greater sensory and contextual
detail in memories of perceived information. Johnson and
Raye (1981, 2000) suggest that a decision about the internal
or external nature of a memory is made based on a weighted
combination of the active features during remembering, or via
a matching process based on the characteristics of previous
comparable memories. For example, if people hear some
words from a speaker and imagine others, they aremore likely
later to mistakenly claim to have heard words that were only
imagined, if their imagery was in the speaker's voice rather
than in their own (Johnson, Foley,& Leach, 1988). According to
the SMF, in addition to such relatively automatic heuristic
attributions based on qualitative characteristics of mental
experiences, reality monitoring (and source monitoring in
general) also sometimes involves more deliberate/systematic
processes that consider current experience in light of previous
knowledge. For example, a ‘memory’ that is inconsistent with
the report of someone else present at the time of an event
might be doubted, whereas external ‘evidence’ (e.g., a train
ticket) might increase confidence (Johnson, Suengas, Foley, &
Raye, 1988).
An impairment in reality monitoring ability has been
implicated in symptoms of mental illness and associated
more widely with the occurrence of anomalous perceptions
and false memories (Johnson, 1991; Johnson & Raye, 1998;
McKay & Dennett, 2009; Radaelli, Benedetti, Cavallaro,
Colombo, & Smeraldi, 2013; Turner, Cipolotti, & Shallice,
2010). For example, auditory verbal hallucinations may arise
from a failure to recognise the self-generated nature of inner
speech (Frith, 1992; Frith& Done, 1988; Hoffman, 1986). Such a
proposal is supported by observations that patients with
schizophrenia exhibit behavioral deficits in reality moni-
toring, which tend to be observed even in the absence of
deficits in recognition memory (Fisher, Mccoy, Poole, &
Vinogradov, 2008; Keefe, Arnold, Bayen, McEvoy, & Wilson,
2002; Stephane, Kuskowski, McClannahan, Surerus, &
Nelson, 2010; Sz€oke et al., 2009; Vinogradov et al., 1997;
Vinogradov, Luks, Schulman, & Simpson, 2008). Such find-
ings suggest there may be overlapping decision processes for
determining the internal or external source of information
that underlie both memory-based reality monitoring and the
reality testing of current perceptual experience. Further evi-
dence supporting this link comes from the observation that
patients with schizophrenia exhibit reduced brain activity
during reality monitoring tasks within the medial anterior
prefrontal cortex (Garrison, 2015; Vinogradov et al., 2008), a
region associated with discriminating real from imagined in-
formation (Simons, Davis, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006;
Simons, Henson, Gilbert, & Fletcher, 2008).
The processes involved in determining internal or external
source during reality monitoring might apply not only to theorigin of memories and real-time perceptual information, but
also to discriminating the origin of knowledge, attitudes and
beliefs (Johnson, 1988, 1991; Slusher & Anderson, 1987). The
observation of reality monitoring impairment in patients with
schizophrenia who experience delusions (e.g., Thoresen et al.,
2014) suggests that weakened realitymonitoringmay result in
the establishment of a delusional belief through an initial
hallucinatory false percept or unrecognised thought (Fletcher
& Frith, 2009; Maher, 1974) and/or from failure of subsequent
reasoning processes which supports the maintenance of the
delusion (Turner & Coltheart, 2010), consistent with the SMF
(Johnson, 1988; Johnson & Raye, 2000) and related two-factor
theories of delusions (Coltheart, 2010). Reality monitoring
impairment has been demonstrated in patients with anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia compared to hemiplegic patientswithout
anosognosia (Jenkinson, Edelstyn, Drakeford, & Ellis, 2009)
suggesting a possible overlap between processes involved in
monitoring action and perceptual information. Furthermore,
a source monitoring explanation also accords with observa-
tions of reality monitoring impairment in individuals who
experience false memories, such as patients with confabula-
tions (Turner et al., 2010). Such individuals often exhibit
temporal confusion (Schnider & Ptak, 1999) consistent with
their failure to recognise an activatedmemory as pertaining to
the past. A reality monitoring impairment during current
thought or imagination might result in the experience of
bizarre or fantastic confabulations, unrelated to reactivation
of previous memory for previous events. Alternatively, spon-
taneous or provoked retrieval of a previous memory with
insufficient source informationmight result inmemory-based
confabulations, with the error arising from the misattribution
of mnemonic content to current experience.
An intriguing finding from the reality monitoring literature
is that participants often exhibit an externalization bias as
evidenced by a greater likelihood of falsely attributing new
items to an external than internal source, or a greater pro-
portion of imagined stimuli erroneously judged to have been
perceived than perceived stimuli judged to have been imag-
ined (Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981). There is much evi-
dence for such an externalization bias in healthy individuals
(Anderson, 1984; Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983; Hashtroudi,
Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989; Hicks, Marsh, & Ritschel, 2002;
Johnson et al., 1981) and in patients with mental illnesses
such as schizophrenia (Bentall, Baker,& Havers, 1991; Brebion
et al., 2000; Brunelin et al., 2006; Seal, Crowe, & Cheung, 1997;
Waters, Badcock, & Maybery, 2006; Woodward, Menon, &
Whitman, 2007). Asymmetric source misattributions pre-
sumably reflect something about the evidence assessed and/
or the criteria used in evaluating mental experience (Johnson
et al., 1981; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). For example, a low
threshold-level of perceptual information taken as evidence
that information is external would produce externalization
errors (Bentall & Slade, 1985). A belief that one would always
remember generating an item (e.g., ‘remember’ cognitive op-
erations information) would result in ‘memories’ without
such information (e.g., false positives on new items) tending
to be attributed to an external source (the ‘it had to be you ef-
fect’; Johnson et al., 1981; Johnson & Raye, 1981). A recent
meta-analysis suggests that a tendency to misattribute in-
ternal events to external sources is associated with
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proneness in nonclinical participants (Brookwell, Bentall, &
Varese, 2013).
Although the SMF incorporates the idea that self-
generation may produce a variety of cues relating to source
(e.g., records of central processes leading to the initial gener-
ation of a concept, motor components of speech production or
writing, perceptual detail from one's voice or seeing what one
has written, etc.), studies testing predictions of the SMF have
tended to focus on the more central rather than peripheral
components (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1980; Finke, Johnson, &
Shyi, 1988; although see, Foley et al., 1983). A related idea
that highlights the overt aspects of self-generation is that
monitoring the origin of one's own actions might occur via
processes that predict the associated sensory consequences
and compare them with forward modelling or efference copy
information (Feinberg, 1978). For example, a comparator
model of motor control proposes that the central nervous
system maintains internal representations of bodily states.
One of these, the forward model, uses an efference copy (an
internally generated duplicate produced through neuronal, or
corollary, discharge) to predict the sensory consequence of
motor commandswhenevermovement is initiated. According
to thismodel, thematching of a top-down efference copywith
the bottom-up sensory input provides subsequent awareness
of the self-generated nature of the action (Miall & Wolpert,
1996; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004).
This model can be applied to the cognitive operations in-
formation that the SMF proposes is used in the identification
of the self-generated origin of thought and imagery. For
example, corollary discharges from speech commands are
considered ordinarily to prepare auditory cortex for self-
generated speech (Feinberg, 1978; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007).
Alien thoughts or hallucinations might arise through an
impairment in either the generation of corollary discharges, or
in the matching process itself, resulting in internally gener-
ated thoughts that are not perceived as having been originated
by the self (Frith & Done, 1988). Notably, such deficit(s) would
produce an external directionality of errors as, in the absence
of an efference copy signal or a failure in the matching pro-
cess, information would be assumed to be externally
perceived. There is much evidence for abnormalities in the
awareness of motor action in patients with schizophrenia
(e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, &
Wolpert, 2000; Posada, Franck, Augier, Georgieff, &
Jeannerod, 2007), with the impairment also implicated in de-
lusions of control where patients believe that their own ac-
tions are being influenced by an outside force (Frith & Done,
1989). Impaired self-monitoring has also been demonstrated
in patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia who show poorer
performance when compared with hemiplegic patients
without anosognosia, on an internal source monitoring task
involving the recollection of whether an action had previously
been performed or imagined (Saj, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 2014).
However, while evidence of impaired action-monitoring in
schizophrenia and anosognosia is clear, the widespread im-
plications of these deficits have been queried. In particular,
theoretical arguments have been raised against the proposal
that action-monitoring deficits lead to the generation of
auditory hallucinations, with Gallagher (2004) questioningwhether the generation of thought has the same physiological
consequences as the generation ofmotor action. Furthermore,
despite some reports of verbal self-monitoring deficits in pa-
tients with hallucinations (Brookwell et al., 2013), there is no
direct evidence for a comparator system for auditory pro-
cessing. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the more cogni-
tive operations that are involved in generatingwords (Johnson
et al., 1981) or mental images (Finke et al., 1988), the greater
the accuracy of reality monitoring. Thus, the central idea that
thought, speech, and other actions involve cognitive opera-
tions that generate cues in real time about the current origin
of mental experience, and that persist as records that can be
used later as cues in remembering, remains to be further
explicated.
In short, a key proposition of the SMF is that reality
monitoring involves assessment of the characteristic features
of the information being reviewed. So for example, the
amount and type of either perceptual information or of
cognitive operations information activated during remem-
bering should affect the accuracy of reality monitoring judg-
ments. To investigate these factors, and their joint effects, we
varied the conditions under which participants encoded pairs
of associatedwords (e.g., Laurel and Hardy, Bacon and Eggs). The
first item of each pair was always presented to the participant,
with the second item either also presented (the ‘perceived’
condition), or with the participant cued with the first letter to
enable them to self-generate the second item (‘imagined’
condition). Participants subsequently undertook a reality
monitoring test in which they were shown the first item of
each pair and asked whether the second item had been
perceived, whether they had imagined it, or whether it was a
new word.
Two aspects of the encoding conditions were varied. The
modality of the presented stimuli was either visual or auditory
and the action participants engaged in when generating the
second item was either to silently verbalize the word-pair
using inner speech (‘think’ condition) or to speak it aloud
(‘speak’ condition). Of primary interest was the impact that
these two factors had on source memory for externally-
derived and internally-generated information. We hypothe-
sized that since participants were instructed to covertly or
overtly vocalize the words, the representation that partici-
pants generated would be more similar to what they
perceived in the auditory than the visual condition and,
hence, reality monitoring should be more difficult in the
auditory modality. The effect of type of action was a more
open question. Compared to covert vocalization, overt
speaking should provide more motoric records and greater
auditory feedback information (Price, 2012). If the speak
condition results in less accurate reality monitoring than the
think trials, it would suggest that the similar motoric and
perceptual feedback on perceived and imagined trials from
speaking reduces the discriminability of these two sources. If
speaking produces better reality monitoring accuracy than
thinking, it would suggest that whatever is added by
speaking (e.g., motoric and/or perceptual information) is
different when vocalizing information that has only been
perceived compared to vocalizing information that has been
generated. Finally, this design allowed us to investigate
whether stimulus modality and type of action both affect
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dent or interact.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
45 native speakers of English (13 male, 32 female) aged 18e35
(M ¼ 21.2, SD ¼ 2.7) took part in the experiment. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing,
had English as their first language and had lived in the UK for
all ormost of their lives (two hadmoved to the UK at the age of
five).
2.2. Design and procedure
The reality monitoring task was administered using E-Prime
2.1 (Psychology Software Tools) software with responses
made through the computer keyboard. Auditory stimuli were
played through headphones worn by the participants for the
duration of the experiment, with the sound adjusted to a
comfortable level using practice stimuli before the task began.
The task was adapted from one used previously (Simons et al.,
2006, 2008) and involved the initial presentation of word-pairs
followed by a test phase in which the participant was asked to
indicate whether a word had earlier been presented within an
intact word-pair using the response ‘perceived’, or had been
presented in a word-pair which had needed to be completed
by imagining the missing word, with the response ‘imagined’.
Previously unseen words were also used in the test phase,
requiring a ‘new’ response. The stimuli consisted of 288 well-
known word-pairs (e.g., ‘Laurel and Hardy’, ‘Bacon and
Eggs’), which had been pilot tested to ensure their familiarity
among adults in the target age range, with a culturally English
background. The task comprised eight separate study and test
blocks, with 24 word-pair stimuli in the study phase and an
additional 12 ‘new’ words included in the test phase.
The experiment used a within participants design
involving the manipulation of three factors: action (speak or
think), modality (visual or auditory) and the source condition
(perceived or imagined). In visual trials, the study phaseword-
pairs were presented on the computer screenwith no auditory
input. In auditory trials, the study phase word-pairs were
provided through the headphones with no visual input.
Following presentation of the word-pairs, either visually or
aurally, and in either perceived or imagined trials, the par-
ticipants were then instructed to either speak the completed
word-pair aloud, or to verbalise it internally (i.e., to ‘think’ it).
Two blocks were used for each of the four different combi-
nations of the action and modality factors to provide study
phase trials that comprised all combinations of auditory/
speak, auditory/think, visual/speak or visual/think.
The timings and stimuli used in the task are shown in
Fig. 1. Each block of the task commencedwith a display screen
indicating the relevant conditions for that block: ‘Look and
Think’, ‘Look and Speak’, ‘Listen and Think’ or ‘Listen and
Speak’ to orient the participant to the study condition asso-
ciated with that block of 24 stimuli. A word-pair was then
presented aurally (3000 msec max) or visually (1500 msec[approximating the mean time taken in the auditory condi-
tion]) with ‘imagined’ visual word-pairs having the second
word substituted by three dots (‘Laurel and…’) and aurally by
a silence (‘Laurel and ’). A blank screen/silence was then fol-
lowed by an audible ‘beep’ and a visual display screen
instructing participants either to ‘Think Now’ or ‘Speak Now’.
This procedure was repeated for each of the 24 word-pairs in
that study phase block, each trial separated by a second blank
screen or silence.
A study phase block was followed immediately by its corre-
sponding test phase. The first word of a studied word-pair, or a
newword,waspresentedaurally (meanpresentation800msec)
or visually (1000 msec) consistent with the modality condition
of the study phase. After a blank screen/silence (1000 msec) a
test screen was presented with the question: ‘Was the accom-
panying word 1. Perceived, 2. Imagined, 3, New?’ The participant
had amaximum of 4 s to respondwith the numbered response
but the task was self-paced (no responses were made outside
this responsewindow). Thisprocedurewas repeated for eachof
the 36 words in that test phase block, each trial separated by a
further blank screen/silence. Theorder ofword-pairspresented
in both study and test phases was pseudo-randomised such
that there was no sequence of perceived, imagined or new
words greater than three items in length. Each block of the task
lasted for around 6min and the eight blocks (two per condition)
were run sequentially without a break.
2.3. Data analysis
Arcsine data transformations were used to enable the
normality assumptions of parametric tests to be met (Howell,
2012). Thereafter, old/new recognition accuracy was calcu-
lated as the adjusted hit rate (i.e., hits e false alarms, where
‘hits’ were defined as the proportion of correct responses to
items recognised as previously presented (‘old’), and ‘false
alarms’ as the proportion of newly presented items which
were incorrectly identified as old). Reality monitoring accu-
racy was calculated as accurate source responses divided by
correct responses recognising an item as old.
Conditional misattribution errors were calculated for
perceived and imagined trials as the number of responses
made for the alternative reality monitoring response as a
proportion of total errors made. So for example, ‘Imagined
judged Perceived’ errors were calculated as the number of
‘Perceived’ responses divided by the sum of ‘Perceived’ and
‘New’ responses that were made to imagined trials. This gives
a measure of misattribution error unrelated to overall accu-
racy for each condition. 12 participantsmade no errors for one
or more of the study conditions and were excluded from the
misattribution analysis of variance, leaving 33 participants for
that analysis. Note that including all participants' data and
comparing imagined judged perceived and perceived judged
imagined errors across the four conditions showed the same
overall externalization bias (t > 2.72, p < .01) as reported below.
Preliminary analyses confirmed the absence of significant
effects of potentially confounding variables on old/new
recognition, reality monitoring accuracy or error rates, of
participants' age, sex or handedness, or of the voice used for
the auditory condition. Thus, these variables are not dis-
cussed further.
Fig. 1 e Examples of task stimuli. Note: red text indicates auditory presentation. Three different voices were used to record
the word-pairs to ensure variety, and the task was fully counterbalanced across participants for the use of voices, the
presentation of word-pairs as perceived, imagined and new, and for the order of the eight blocks (two per four study phase
conditions).
Table 1 e Old/new recognition accuracy for perceived and
imagined trials.
Perceived Imagined
Mean SD Mean SD
% % % %
Auditory/speak 87.6 9.6 90.8 8.3
Visual/speak 84.9 9.0 94.2 6.1
Auditory/think 80.8 13.4 83.9 11.9
Visual/think 77.8 11.9 90.4 8.1
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3.1. Old/new recognition
The effect of action (speak, think), modality (visual, auditory)
and word-pair source (perceived, imagined) on old/new
recognition was assessed first (Table 1). Analysis of variance
indicated a significant main effect of source, F(1, 44) ¼ 72.199,
p < .001, hp
2 ¼ .621 and action, F(1, 44) ¼ 32.857, p < .001,
hp
2 ¼ .428, but no significant effect of modality, F(1, 44) ¼ 1.450,
p ¼ .235, hp2 ¼ .032. There was also a significant interaction
between source and modality, F(1, 44) ¼ 41.872, p < .001,
hp
2 ¼ .488, but no other interactions were significant, F(1,
44) < .321, p > .574, hp
2 < .007.
In short, recognition memory was better for imagined
stimuli (M ¼ 89.8%, SD ¼ 6.8%) compared with those that hadbeen perceived (M ¼ 82.8%, SD ¼ 7.7%), a type of generation
effect (Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007). Recognition
memory was also enhanced by the act of speaking (M ¼ 89.4%,
SD ¼ 5.9%) compared with thinking at the point of encoding
(M ¼ 83.2%, SD ¼ 8.9%), a type of production effect (MacLeod,
Gopie, Hourihan, Neary, & Ozubko, 2010). The modality of
Fig. 3 e Misattribution errors.
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differed for perceived and imagined stimuli: recognition
memory was better with auditory than visual presentation for
perceived stimuli: t(44)¼ 2.590, p¼ .013, d¼ .393, but betterwith
visual than auditory presentation for imagined stimuli:
t(44) ¼ 4.134, p < .001, d ¼ .635. This interaction likely reflects
that recognition in this task is based not simply on undiffer-
entiated familiarity, but by the more specific features partici-
pants are assessing in making source attributions. Our main
analyses of realitymonitoring (see below)were conditionalized
on old/new recognition and more specifically address ques-
tions about conditions that affect judgments about theorigin of
memories.
3.2. Reality monitoring
A 2 (action: speak, think)  2 (modality: visual, auditory)  2
(source: perceived, imagined) repeated measures ANOVA
(Fig. 2) revealed significant main effects of action, F(1,
44) ¼ 22.408, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .337, modality F(1, 44) ¼ 23.810,
p < .001, hp
2 ¼ .351, and source, F(1, 44) ¼ 5.341, p ¼ .026,
hp
2 ¼ .108. Furthermore there was a significant interaction
between modality and source, F(1, 44) ¼ 15.120, p < .001,
hp
2 ¼ .256, but no other interactions were significant: F(1,
44) < .823, p > .369, hp
2 < .018.
The main effect of action reflects that source accuracy was
greater for speak than think trials. The modality by source
interaction reflects that, for perceived trials, there was no
significant difference between aurally and visually presented
word-pairs [t(44) ¼ .618, p ¼ .540, d ¼ .099] but, for imagined
trials, there was significantly lower accuracy for aurally pre-
sented word-pairs compared with visually presented word-
pairs, t(44) ¼ 6.752, p < .001, d ¼ 1.107.
Thus, reality monitoring performance was better for
spoken than thought items, and auditory presentation resul-
ted in poorer reality monitoring performance than visual
presentation, especially for the self-generated items.
3.3. Misattribution errors
Conditional misattribution error rate was calculated as a
measure independent of reality monitoring accuracy to giveFig. 2 e Reality monitoring accuracy for perceived and imagine
mean.an indication of the proportion of errors that were mis-
attributed to the alternative reality monitoring condition. The
error rates for misattributions of perceived and imagined
stimuli for the different action and modality conditions are
shown in Fig. 3. There was a significant main effect of error
direction F(1, 32) ¼ 21.606, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .403, indicating that
the proportion of externalization errors (‘Imagined judged
Perceived’) was greater than internalization errors (‘Perceived
judged Imagined’). There was no significant main effect of
action, F(1, 32) ¼ .051, p ¼ .822, hp2 ¼ .002, or modality, F(1,
32) ¼ 3.066, p ¼ .090, hp2 ¼ .087, and no significant interactions,
F(1, 32) < .261, p > .613, hp
2 < .008.4. Discussion
In the present experiment, participants were presented with
intact word-pairs on some trials and, on other trials, they
completed word-pairs by imagining the second item when
cued with the first. We investigated the effect of manipulating
at encoding the perceptual modality (visual vs auditory) in
which stimuli were presented and the action of the partici-
pant (speak vs think) during encoding on subsequent reality
monitoring (‘did you perceive or imagine the item associated
with this cue?’). We observed poorer reality monitoring in thed trials. Note: Error bars represent ±standard error of the
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modality, in which accuracy was lower for imagined, but not
perceived, trials that had been presented auditorily compared
to visually. Participants were more likely to misattribute
imagined items to perception than perceived items to imagi-
nation (i.e., higher rate of externalization than internalization
errors); moreover, this asymmetrical error pattern was unaf-
fected by whether stimuli were presented visually or aurally
and whether participants spoke or only thought their re-
sponses during encoding. Below we discuss these findings in
light of the SMF and with respect to their potential relation to
hallucinations, confabulation and delusions.
4.1. The effect of modality
According to the SMF account, reality monitoring accuracy
should be better the greater the difference between the
perceptual content of external and internal stimuli. Thus, we
expected that reality monitoring accuracy would be higher for
visually presented compared to aurally presented stimuli.
That is, it should be easier to discriminate later between
perceived visual words and inner speech than between
perceived auditory speech and inner speech because self-
generated inner speech is more likely to have auditory than
visual qualities. Reality monitoring was better in the visual
than the auditory condition, but only for imagined stimuli.
Note that this was not because of lower old/new recognition
for imagined that perceived items in the auditory conditions
(see Table 1). Thus, this dissociation between old/new recog-
nition and source monitoring is consistent with the idea that
imagined items were particularly difficult to identify as self-
generated in the auditory condition not because they gave
rise to ‘weak’ memories but because the specific characteris-
tic(s) either encoded or assessed during later reality moni-
toring were not as reliable cue(s) to source, presumably
because they seemed more like perceptually-derived mem-
ories in their auditory qualities.
The observed findings invite a speculative account of the
greater prevalence of auditory verbal hallucinations
compared to visual hallucinations in patients with schizo-
phrenia and other clinical conditions (Aleman & Larøi, 2008).
Realitymonitoring of visual stimuli may, on average, be easier
compared to auditory stimuli. That is, substantially greater
perceptual content of perceived visual stimuli compared to
the level of visual detail in imagined visual stimuli may make
it relatively easy to distinguish external from self-generated
visual imagery, whereas the source-related detail available
in inner speech may typically be more similar to that of
external speech. Of course, individual differences in visual
and auditory imagery should modulate such effects, and
indeed our data hint at this with only a moderate correlation
found in participants' reality monitoring accuracy for imag-
ined stimuli presented in the auditory and visual modalities.
Consistent with such predictions, there is mounting evidence
that auditory and visual hallucinations may be associated
with the sporadic over-stimulation of sensory association
cortices, such as voice selective regions in the superior tem-
poral gyrus for auditory hallucinations and the visual cortices
for visual hallucinations (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, & Aleman,
2008), which might produce more vivid perceptual contentin comparison to that typically associated with self-generated
information. Evidence to support this proposal comes from
fMRI analysis of cortical activation during state studies of both
auditory and visual hallucinations (Garrison, 2015; Ku¨hn &
Gallinat, 2012), which have identified hallucination-related
activation in the respective sensory cortices, and from
research observing neural activity in speech sensitive audi-
tory cortex even during silence (Hunter et al., 2006).
Converging evidence comes from fMRI studies of healthy
participants. Similar brain regions are active during visual
perception and imagination (Johnson & Johnson, 2014;
Johnson, Mitchell, Raye, D'Esposito, & Johnson, 2007;
O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000) and scores on a scale
measuring proneness to hallucinations were related to activ-
ity in superior temporal gyrus for misattributions of imagined
to perceived spoken words during a reality monitoring test
(Sugimori, Mitchell, Raye, Greene, & Johnson, 2014).
4.2. The effect of action
Also of interest is that speaking compared to thinking during
encoding resulted in an advantage later in reality monitoring.
Both thinking and speaking include critical cognitive opera-
tions that generate the target response on imagination trialse
cognitive operations information that later could provide cues
about the origin of remembered items. Beyond thought,
speaking includes further action planning and execution and
additional perceptual detail based on auditory feedback from
the participant's voice (Price, 2012). If participants had spoken
only the imagined items, this additional information could
provide potential information for making source attributions.
However, during encoding, the perceived items were also
spoken by the participant, so why would speaking confer a
reality monitoring advantage over thinking in this context? In
the Introduction we suggested that repeating aloud some-
thing that was only perceived might be different than
speaking aloud something that had been generated. One
possibility is that “compiling” a plan for speaking a word that
has just been perceptually presented is more automatic and/
or less complex than compiling a plan for speaking a word
that has not just been presented but, rather, has just been
generated. Furthermore, if plans for overt speaking are more
complex than plans for covert thinking, it seems reasonable
that the difference in the planning operations generated be-
tween imagined and perceived trials would be greater in the
speak than the think condition. If so, the combined cognitive
operations involved in generation and response planning
should better differentiate imagined from perceived items in
the speak than the think conditions. Such an idea that speech
involvesmore complex self-monitoring than thought could be
easily represented in comparator forward models of action
planning as highlighted in the Introduction (Feinberg, 1978;
Jones & Fernyhough, 2007).
In any event, the fact that speaking did not reduce reality
monitoring compared to thinking suggests that the speak
condition may be especially appropriate for studying reality
monitoring in patient populations in which compliance on
think trials may be an issue. It is also notable that the cogni-
tive operations associated with generating imagined re-
sponses, plus any possible additional useful records generated
c o r t e x 8 7 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 0 8e1 1 7 115by speaking (e.g., action planning/execution processes) did
not interact with the advantage derived from visual compared
to auditory presentation. This suggests that records of
perceptual detail and operations involved in self-generation
make independent contributions to reality monitoring in
healthy adults in this task.
4.3. Asymmetry in reality monitoring errors
(externalization bias)
Previous observations have suggested that participants in re-
ality monitoring studies often exhibit a greater proportion of
external than internal misattribution errors (Johnson et al.,
1981; Johnson & Raye, 1981). This tendency to make dispro-
portionate numbers of externalization errors was also
observed in the current experiment. Furthermore, the level of
misattribution bias was independent of both the modality of
presentation of the stimuli, and of the action of the participant
during encoding. This suggests that a common factor may
affect all of the conditions in the study, for example, the
quality of the cognitive operations evidence. Poor or absent
cognitive operations information regarding the initial gener-
ation of responses on imagine trials would increase the
chances of an externalization error. The stability of the
externalization bias across the conditions in this study is also
consistentwith evaluation of evidence prior to efference copy/
sensory matching in a self-monitoring process related to
comparator models for inner speech (Feinberg, 1978; Jones &
Fernyhough, 2007). The current study cannot distinguish be-
tween these alternatives. However, what is clear is that the
directionality of bias is consistent with the nature of percep-
tual errors in hallucinations and non-memory-based confab-
ulations, where internally generated information tends to be
ascribed to an external source (e.g., inner speech is recognised
as a spoken voice) much more often than an external
perception is misrepresented as imagery or thought.
Hallucinations, confabulation and delusions represent a
broad range of clinically significant subjective experiences
that involve source discrimination failures (e.g., Johnson,
1988). Combining ideas from current theoretical models of
on-line reality discrimination with ideas from the SMF should
advance a broad theoretical framework for such experiences.
For example, an impaired self-monitoring process which at-
tributes ongoing, internally generated information to that of
an external agent (consistent with efference copy accounts of
motor control) could help explain the mechanism by which
self-generated cognitions may come to be experienced as
alien (Jones & Fernyhough, 2007; Waters et al., 2012; but see,
Gallagher, 2004). The impaired self-monitoring of internally
generated imagery might, for instance, lead to the develop-
ment of a fantastic confabulation as the information acquires
the phenomenal qualities of being related to an external
source. This broader account of reality discrimination is also
consistent with theoretical explanations relating to impair-
ments in the recognition of action in anosognosia
(Fotopoulou, 2010; Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Saj et al., 2014) as
well as in delusions of control (Frith & Done, 1989).
Other key issues for investigation include the involvement
of underlying brain regions, particularly medial prefrontal
cortex and anterior cingulate cortex, which are implicated inmonitoring processes (Buda, Fornito, Bergstrom, & Simons,
2011; Garrison et al., 2015; Simons et al., 2008, 2006;
Vinogradov et al., 2008). Further understanding is also
needed of the inter-relation between faster non-deliberate
judgement processes which may operate during perception
or during remembering on initially activated information, and
slower more deliberative metacognitive evaluation which
might take into account existing beliefs and knowledge and
which might explain the embellishment and/or continued
maintenance of impaired beliefs. Investigating such questions
related to both themechanisms of reality discriminations and
their neural substrates, could thus provide both cognitive
insight into how we discriminate self-generated information
from that which is real, as well as routes towards the devel-
opment of therapeutic interventions for symptoms of mental
illness that reflect failures in reality monitoring.Acknowledgements
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